Chapter 24. Instrumental Variables Analysis of Randomized Experiments with Two-Sided Noncompliance

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Table of Contents

24.1. Introduction

24.2 The Angrist Draft Lottery Data

24.3 Compliance Status

24.4 Intention-To-Treat Effects

24.5 Instrumental Variables

Conclusion

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Previous chapters...

- Unconfoundness of the treatment of interest is questionable
- With the existence of noncompliers (one-sided)
 - (W_i) / confounded
 - Instrumental variable \rightarrow estimate "local" average effects for the subpopulation
- Completely randomized design and one assumption
 - Completely randomized \rightarrow (Z_i), unconfoundness \rightarrow enable to esitmate ITT.
 - Exclusion assumptions \rightarrow allow to estimate "local" average effects for the compliers

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24.1 Introduction

- IV analyses for two-sided noncompliance in a randomized experiment.
- Completely randomized and two assumptions
 - Completely randomized \rightarrow (Z_i), unconfoundness \rightarrow ITT.
 - Exclusion assumptions and monotonicity assumption \rightarrow allow to estimate "local" average effects for the subpopulation of compliers

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24.2 The Angrist Draft Lottery Data

- ► Serving in the military (veteran / non-veteran) → earning
- Angrist(1990) exploits the implementation of the draft during the Vietnam War.
 - All men of a certain age were required to register for the draft.
 - Draft priority was assigned randomly based on the birth dates per birth year
- Possibility of the existence of complier
 - Medical test / minimum educational level
 - Low lottery number ightarrow decided to enter graduate school / move to Canada

The Angrist Draft Lottery Data

	Non-Veterans ($N_c = 6,675$)				Veterans ($N_{t} = 2,030$)			
	Min	Max	Mean	(S.D.)	Min	Max	Mean	(S.D.)
Draft eligible	0	1	0.24	(0.43)	0	1	0.40	(0.49)
Yearly earnings (in \$1,000's)	0	62.8	11.8	(11.5)	0	50.7	11.7	(11.8)
Earnings positive	0	1	0.88	(0.32)	0	1	0.91	(0.29)
Year of birth	50	52	51.1	(0.8)	50	52	50.9	(0.8)

Table 24.1. Summary Statistics for the Angrist Draft Lottery Data

24.3 Compliance Status

Compliance Status

- A function of the pair of potential responses $(W_i(0), W_i(1))$

Compliance types

- Denote compliance type by G_i

$$G_{i} = g(W_{i}(0), W_{i}(1)) = \begin{cases} \text{nt } (nevertaker) & \text{if } W_{i}(0) = 0, W_{i}(1) = 0, \\ \text{co } (complier) & \text{if } W_{i}(0) = 0, W_{i}(1) = 1, \\ \text{df } (defier) & \text{if } W_{i}(0) = 1, W_{i}(1) = 0, \\ \text{at } (alwaystaker) & \text{if } W_{i}(0) = 1, W_{i}(1) = 1. \end{cases}$$

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Compliance Status-One-sided case

• We only observed the realized treatment status of $W_i(0)$ or $W_i(1)$

One-sided

$$\begin{array}{l} - \mbox{ If } Z_i = 1, \, W_i^{obs} = 0 \to (W_i(0), \, W_i(1)) = (0, 0) \ / \ \mbox{nc} \\ - \ \mbox{ If } Z_i = 1, \, W_i^{obs} = 1 \to (W_i(0), \, W_i(1)) = (0, 1) \ / \ \mbox{co} \\ - \ \mbox{ If } Z_i = 0, \, W_i^{obs} = 0 \to (W_i(0), \, W_i(1)) = (0, 0) \ \mbox{or} \ (0, 1) \ / \ \mbox{co} \ \mbox{nc} \\ - \ \mbox{ If } Z_i = 0, \, W_i^{obs} = 1 \to (W_i(0), \, W_i(1)) = (1, 0) \ \mbox{or} \ (1, 1) \ / \ \mbox{co} \ \mbox{nc} \end{array}$$

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Compliance Status-One-sided case

Two-sided

 $\begin{array}{l} - \mbox{ If } Z_i = 1, W_i^{obs} = 0 \rightarrow (W_i(0), W_i(1)) = (0,0) \mbox{ or } (1,0) \ / \ \mbox{nt or df} \\ - \mbox{ If } Z_i = 1, W_i^{obs} = 1 \rightarrow (W_i(0), W_i(1)) = (0,1) \mbox{ or } (1,1) \ / \ \mbox{df or at} \\ - \mbox{ If } Z_i = 0, W_i^{obs} = 0 \rightarrow (W_i(0), W_i(1)) = (0,0) \mbox{ or } (0,1) \ / \ \mbox{nt or co} \\ - \mbox{ If } Z_i = 0, W_i^{obs} = 1 \rightarrow (W_i(0), W_i(1)) = (1,0) \mbox{ or } (1,1) \ / \ \mbox{df or at} \end{array}$

That is why two-sided noncompliance case is more comlicated.

- Need additional assumption to identify the causal effect
- Monotonicity \rightarrow No defier

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24.4 Intention-To-Treat Effects

Largely unchanged from the one-sided case

- Unit-level effect of 4 compliance types
 - -1 for co
 - 0 for nt and at
 - -1 for df

Super-population average ITT

$$\mathrm{ITT}_{\mathrm{W}} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathrm{sp}} \left[W_i(1) - W_i(0) \right] = \pi_{\mathrm{co}} - \pi_{\mathrm{df}}$$

The ITT effect on the primary outcome

$$\mathsf{ITT}_{\mathrm{Y}} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathrm{sp}}\left[Y_{i}\left(1, W_{i}(1)\right) - Y_{i}\left(0, W_{i}(0)\right)\right]$$

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Random Assignment of Z_i

Assumption 24.1 (Super-Population Random Assignment)

 $Z_i \perp (W_i(0), W_i(1), Y_i(0,0), Y_i(0,1), Y_i(1,0), Y_i(1,1))$

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ITT Estimands for W

The average causal effect of assignment on W_i

$$\widehat{\mathrm{ITT}_{\mathrm{W}}} = \bar{W}_{1}^{\mathrm{obs}} - \bar{W}_{0}^{\mathrm{obs}}$$

where $z=0,1, \textit{N}_{z}=\sum_{i=1}^{\textit{N}}1_{\textit{Z}_{i}=z}, \bar{\textit{W}}_{z}^{\rm obs}=\sum_{i:\textit{Z}_{i}=z}\textit{W}_{i}^{\sf obs} \textit{/}\textit{N}_{z}$

with (Neyman) sampling variance estimated as

$$\widehat{\mathbb{V}}(\widehat{\mathrm{ITT}_{\mathrm{W}}}) = rac{s_{Y,1}^2}{N_1} + rac{s_{Y,0}^2}{N_0}$$

where

$$s_{W,z}^2 = \sum_{i:Z_i=z} \left(W_i^{
m obs} - \bar{W}_z^{
m obs}
ight)^2 / (N_z - 1) = \bar{W}_z \left(1 - \bar{W}_z
ight) / (N_z - 1)$$

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ITT Estimands for Y

The difference in average outcomes by assignment status,

$$\widehat{\mathrm{ITT}_{\mathrm{Y}}} = \bar{Y}_1^{\mathrm{obs}} - \bar{Y}_0^{\mathrm{obs}}$$

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where $z=0,1, \textit{N}_{z}=\sum_{i=1}^{\textit{N}} 1_{\textit{Z}_{i}=z}, \bar{\textit{Y}}_{z}^{\rm obs}=\sum_{i:\textit{Z}_{i}=z}\textit{Y}_{i}^{obs} \textit{/N}_{z}$

with (Neyman) sampling variance estimated as

$$\widehat{\mathbb{V}}(\widehat{\mathrm{ITT}}) = \frac{s_{W,0}^2}{N_0} + \frac{s_{W,1}^2}{N_1}$$

where $s_{Y,z}^2 = \sum_{i:Z_i=z} \left(Y_i^{\mathrm{obs}} - \bar{Y}_z^{\mathrm{obs}}\right)^2 / (N_z - 1)$

24.5 Instrumental Variables

- Main resluts of this chapter
- Consider assumptions underlying instrument variables to draw inferences about the relation W_i and Y_i

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- Exclusion Retrictions
- Monotonicity Assumption

Exclusion Restrictions

Assumption 24.2 (Exclusion Restriction for Nevertakers) For all units i with G_i = nt,

$$Y_i(0,0) = Y_i(1,0)$$

Assumption 24.3 (Exclusion Restriction for Alwaystakers) For all units i with G_i = at,

$$Y_i(0,1) = Y_i(1,1)$$

• Assumption 24.4 (Exclusion Restriction for Compliers) For all units *i* with $G_i = co$,

$$Y_i(0,w) = Y_i(1,w)$$

for both levels of the treatment w

Assumption 24.5 (Exclusion Restriction for Defiers) For all units i with

 $G_i = df$,

$$Y_i(0,w)=Y_i(1,w)$$

for both levels of the treatment w

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ITT Estimands for Y

$$\begin{split} \text{ITT}_{Y} = & \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y(1, W(1)) - Y(0, W(0))] \\ = & \sum_{g \in \{\text{co,nt,at,df}\}} \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y_i(1, W_i(1)) - Y_i(0, W_i(0)) \mid G_i = g] \cdot \mathsf{Pr}_{\text{sp}}(G_i = g) \\ = & \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y_i(1, W_i(1)) - Y_i(0, W_i(0)) \mid G_i = \text{co}] \cdot \mathsf{Pr}_{\text{sp}}(G_i = \text{co}) \\ & + \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y_i(1, W_i(1)) - Y_i(0, W_i(0)) \mid G_i = \text{nt}] \cdot \mathsf{Pr}_{\text{sp}}(G_i = \text{nt}) \\ & + \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y_i(1, W_i(1)) - Y_i(0, W_i(0)) \mid G_i = \text{at}] \cdot \mathsf{Pr}_{\text{sp}}(G_i = \text{at}) \\ & + \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y_i(1, W_i(1)) - Y_i(0, W_i(0)) \mid G_i = \text{df}] \cdot \mathsf{Pr}_{\text{sp}}(G_i = \text{df}) \\ & = & \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y_i(1, 1) - Y_i(0, 0) \mid G_i = \text{co}] \cdot \pi_{\text{co}} \\ & - \mathbb{E}_{\text{sp}}[Y_i(0, 1) - Y_i(1, 0) \mid G_i = \text{df}] \cdot \pi_{\text{df}} \end{split}$$

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Assumption 24.8 (Monotonicity/No Defiers)

 $W_i(1) \geq W_i(0)$

With assumptions 24.4 and 24.8

$$\mathrm{ITT}_{\mathrm{Y}} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathrm{sp}}\left[Y_{i}(1) - Y_{i}(0) \mid G_{i} = \mathrm{co}\right] \cdot \pi_{\mathrm{co}}$$

Theorem 24.1 (Local Average Treatment Effect)

with Assumptions 24.1-24.4 and 24.8 hold.

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Conclusion

- Introduce types of noncompliance
- Extend to two-sided noncompliance cases
 - Completely randomized experiments
 - Exclusion restrictions and monotonicity assumption

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The End

